CALPERS ARTICLE CONTINUED FROM HOME PAGE

It was reported that as of Oct. 31, 2012 CalPERS held real estate assets of $19.2 billion. My study reveals that CalPERS could double its money tied to mortgage securities instead of losing half of what it invested if the mortgage backed trusts were forced to renegotiate ALL the mortgages to 2% across the board. The amortization used is only 25 years taking into account most of the trusts are already 5 years old.

CalPERS had 8.7% of its total assets in real estate as of Sept. 30, according to a fact sheet on the system’s website. An April 2010 report said CalPERS made policy changes allowing more risk and debt, followed by large ill-timed investments at the height of the real estate boom, resulting in a real estate portfolio worth $13.7 billion which was down 47.5 percent in 2010. CalPERS real estate losses have been well-publicized, nearly $1 billion in a Los Angeles area residential development, $500 million in New York rental units, and $91 million on a stalled commercial development in Boston, but I could find no data on residential mortgage backed securities so I did my own study. Taking just four trusts identified in CalPERS list of held investments, the results were astounding.

My study proposes this hypothetical: “What if you just modified all of the remaining loans in these residential mortgage backed securities to 2% interest?”

 

Calpers Exhibit 1
Calpers Exhibit 2
Calpers Exhibit 3
Calpers Exhibit 4

CALPERS STUDY

CURRENT

AVERAGE

CURRENT

HYPOTHETICAL

CURRENT

IF ALL MODIFIED

CURRENT

CALPERS

CERTIFICATE

INTEREST

MONTHLY

MODIFY ALL

LOSS

GAIN OVER LIFE

RECOVERY

TRUSTS HELD

BALANCE

RATE

INTEREST

LOANS AT 2%

SEVERITY

OF SECURITY

PATH

HVMLT 2007-7 $ 912,028,966.00

1.244%

$ 918,726.00 $ 3,865,680.00

49%

$ 1,159,704,000.00 $ 465,134,772.00
BAYVIEW 2006-D $ 180,543,995.00

2.698%

$ 383,741.00 $ 765,245.00

46%

$ 229,573,500.00 $ 97,493,753.00
RASC 2007-KS3 $ 582,166,839.00

0.604%

$ 240,935.00 $ 2,467,550.00

29%

$ 740,265,000.00 $ 413,338,456.00
SAMI 2007-AR4 $ 839,642,486.00

0.516%

$ 500,210.00 $ 3,558,850.00

49%

$ 1,067,655,000.00 $ 428,217,667.00
TOTAL $ 2,514,382,286.00 $ 2,043,612.00 $ 10,657,325.00 $ 3,197,197,500.00 $1,404,184,648.00
MONTHLY GAIN $ 8,613,713.00 LIFE OF SECURITIES GAIN $1,793,012,852.00

The result: Currently the monthly pass through interest received due to the high level of defaults (borrowers paying nothing) on these four trusts is $2,043,612. If all loans were offered a modification at 2% the monthly pass through would be $10,657,325. Over the life of the security with the current loss severity reported by the trust, the $2,514,382,286 originally invested will recover only $1,404,184,648 for a loss of over $1,110,197, 638. That figure could be worse depending on the future declines in housing prices. However if all the loans were offered a modification of 2% instead of a loss, the return would be a gain of $1,793,012,852. Considering billions of dollars are at stake here, shouldn’t CalPERS consider a full study of all residential and commercial trusts and demand accountability from Wall Street?

Don’t believe me? Pull out your own Truth in Lending Disclosure statement and see the shocking numbers as to how much you will actually pay back over the life of the loan. The amortization in this study was done using the same amortization software for mortgage loans. CalPERS and other pension funds should insist that the managers of those funds do the math and force the loans to be modified to ensure the long term return they signed up for.

It’s common for the Trustees who manage the trusts for the benefit of the investors to put modification decisions to a vote of the security holders. Here is an example. On October 5, 2010, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC”), as trustee for each of the trusts listed in the table below requested direction from Certificateholders regarding modifications for loans OneWest Bank, F.S.B. serviced on behalf of the related Trust. Overwhelmingly the investors voted to modify the loans.

Trust Support Oppose

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AF1 51.47% 16.60%

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AR1 45.60% 12.83%

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AR5 34.64% 2.11%

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AR6 35.09% 9.34%

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-AB1 0.00% 0.00%

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-AR1 24.04% 15.81%

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-AR2 26.92% 0.05%

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-AR3 50.77% 19.60%

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-BAR1 71.71% 2.45%

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-OA2 16.38% 24.94%

 

Keep in mind CalPERS doesn’t own the entire security, so other pension funds and investors should pay attention too. Turning around the downward spiral is in everyone’s best interest, except Wall Street. Why? It’s all about the structure of the securities. The main point that everyone is missing is the manipulation of LIBOR to save the banks which hurts savers, retirees and investors.

The 16 banks that set LIBOR are Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Barclays Bank, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HBOS, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Lloyds TSB Bank, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, The Norinchukin Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, and West LB. Almost all of these banks are heavily involved in the mortgage backed securities wherein they promised the investors LIBOR + the small margin. Can you see the conflict here? I promise you LIBOR + a small margin and I control LIBOR. LIBOR rates are not objective and intentionally will be kept low hurting all pension funds until the banks can dissolve all the real estate toxic securities they created while protecting huge bonuses and profits for them. As a fiduciary, how can the pension funds sit by and let this occur?

 

So how does this work? The majority of the mortgage backed securities tied the investor pass through rate to the one month LIBOR plus a small margin for the AAA investment classes which are the only classes that pension funds like CalPERS could invest in.

The investors WILL NEVER RECEIVE ANYMORE IF THE HOMEOWNER PAYS 10% or 2%! But they would receive more if LIBOR went up. The real villains here are the banks that set LIBOR, not the homeowners.

CLASS INTEREST PROMISED RATING
PENSION FUNDSClass 1A-1A LIBOR + 0.205% AAA
Class 2A-1A1 LIBOR + 0.090 AAA
Class 2A-1A2 LIBOR + 0.160 AAA
Class 2A-1A3 LIBOR + 0.240 AAA
Class 2A-1B LIBOR + 0.200% AAA
Class 2A-2A LIBOR + 0.190% AAA
Class 2A-2B LIBOR + 0.250% AAA
Class 2A-2C LIBOR + 0.190% AAA
SUBORDINATEClass B-1 LIBOR + 0.400% AA+
Class B-2 LIBOR + 0.420% AA
Class B-3 LIBOR + 0.450% AA-
Class B-4 LIBOR + 0.640% A+
Class B-5 LIBOR + 0.780% A-
Class B-6 LIBOR + 1.600% BBB
Class B-7 LIBOR + 2.000% BBB-

 

The subordinate classes which are typically identified as M or B classes are all but wiped out. Think of it as a sandwich, the bottom classes in this chart (B-7 to B-1) take the losses first one at a time up to the amount they invested. Once that occurs they are out. Then the losses are allocated to the A classes from the bottom up the same way. The top rated classes take the principal as the loans are liquidated and receive the pass through promised from the top down, which is now less than .50% in most cases. Loans were separated in groups and the groups were assigned to specific AAA classes. It is those classes that receive the principal from the liquidation in that group. The formula is a bit more complex, and each trust has slight differences, but for simplicity I’m describing the basic structure here.

Now we can look at the history of the indexes that homeowner’s loans are tied to and compare them with the investor pass through indexes. Whether homeowner’s loans were tied to the monthly Treasury average “MTA” or the 6 month LIBOR, the two most common indexes, Wall Street had already created a spread by structuring the investor pass through rate to the one month LIBOR and the borrower rate to a different index. Then Wall Street went further and added huge margins between 2% and as high as 8% to the homeowner’s index. As you can see this formula would not work if the loans were fixed.

 

So who got all the excess interest the banks tried to squeeze out of homeowners? The residual or excess interest classes were predominantly held by the Wall Street banks and hedge funds that created the securities. The excess classes could be incorporated in the first security formed or Wall Street could structure an entirely different security stripped off known as a Net Interest Margin security “NIM.” The residual excess interest classes were insured and the wizards of Wall Street pulled many individual excess interest tranches from different securities and parked them in offshore CDO’s which they created and then bet against using International Swap Dealers Association “ISDA,” which is another MERS type private club for international bankers. These vehicles made a select few insiders filthy rich and sent others who were stupid enough to act as counterparty into ruin, or straight to a government bailout. Don’t you wish Wall Street would have clued us all in on the scheme?

Wall Street could not create residual or net interest margins from fixed rate loans! This was free money for them using a complex model that they designed to make money on no matter what happened with the loans. But the most sinister is the scheme devised wherein the investors would pay for the loans- full cost to acquire them, but the pension funds would only receive a fraction of the interest paid on them! Wall Street could skim off the top and profit wildly at everyone else’s expense.

The trust creators could hold residual, excess interest, and junior tranche investments in the trust as a bonus for structuring the deal, as detailed in a paper by Warrington College of Business and University of Florida called, “Works of Friction? Originator-Sponsor Affiliation and Losses on Mortgage-Backed Securities.” The paper reveals: One objective of the sponsor is to structure the deal in such a way as to achieve the lowest overall cost of funding given the characteristics of the underlying pool of mortgages. Sponsors are compensated through fees charged to investors, through any premium paid by investors on securities over par value, and through holding the most junior unrated bond or in the case of an XS/OC structure the residual interest of the MBS (see Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008)).

 

For example, the prospectus of Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-7, in which Bear Stearnswas the deal sponsor, states as follows: “The Class R Certificates and the Class R-X Certificates, which are not offered pursuant to this prospectus, will represent the residual interests in the real estate mortgage investment conduits established by the trust. Holders of the Residual Certificates will be entitled to receive any residual cash flow from the mortgage pool… The initial owner of the Residual Certificates is expected to be Bear Stearns Securities Corp.”

 

By holding the most junior position, the sponsor retains first loss exposure (up to the amountof the most junior tranche) as well as any upside profit potential and thus an interest in the performance of the underlying pool of mortgages. The way this works varies with the structure employed.

 

Investors who were sold AAA investment tranches were not the beneficiary of the highinterest charged it was the Wall Street banks like Bear Stearns who would benefit. This scheme was perpetrated on all parties involved, the homeowner, the insurers, and the investors.

 

As you can clearly see at the time when they snookered all the pension funds the big banks set the indexes at 4-5% making this look like a great investment. But by July 2009 the same banks had driven the index investors returns were tied to (1-month LIBOR) down to .4541% to save them from their own scheme. Pension funds were screwed. They were not looking for a huge return, they bought the safest AAA classes which offered the least return but were sold as a safe long term investment. But with massive borrowers defaults which the big banks knew would occur, they could not pay the pass through rate promised unless they drove LIBOR down to zero. The FED has already announced LIBOR will be kept at near zero through the liquidation of all the securities predicted to be around 2014. Of course the FED doesn’t present it this way.

 

Date

MTA

1-Month
LIBOR

6-Month
LIBOR

Apr 2005

2.5042

3.0826

3.4151

Apr 2006

4.1425

5.0245

5.2879

Apr 2007

5.0292

5.3201

5.3581

Apr 2008

3.5283

2.7809

2.8227

Apr 2009

1.3400

0.4541

1.6619

Apr 2010

0.4125

0.2573

0.4688

Apr 2011

0.2783

0.2216

0.4423

2012

Mar 2012

0.1525

0.2420

0.7420

 

Where are all the excess interest tranches now?

Most of these classes have all been closed now and will not get anymore distributions. Many have been liquidated through dissolution of offshore CDO’s after ISDA credit events forced the liquidation. Here is an example from a Bear Stearns trust “BSALT 2006-4” monthly investor report. As you can see all the bottom classes have taken the losses and will no longer receive any distribution. Also notice the losses are creeping up to the AAA classes. The class 1-2A-2 is a class that has been paid out and closed through insurances. I frequently find these closed classes in the Maiden Lane portfolio after an AIG payout.

Certificateholder Distribution Summary

Class

CUSIP


Record Date

Certificate
Pass-Through
Rate

Beginning
Certificate
Balance


Interest
Distribution


Principal
Distribution

Current
Realized
Loss

Ending
Certificate
Balance

I-1A-1

073871AA3

03/23/2012

0.40400%

160,148,798.59

50,322.31

1,123,149.59

0.00

159,025,649.01

I-1A-2

073871AB1

03/23/2012

0.47400%

19,832,570.02

7,311.61

139,089.04

832,398.42

18,861,082.55

I-2A-1

073871AC9

03/23/2012

0.41400%

229,402,145.51

73,867.49

786,454.30

1,764,785.75

226,850,905.46

I-2A-2

073871AD7

03/23/2012

0.47400%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

I-3A-1

073871AE5

03/23/2012

0.40400%

176,761,877.88

55,542.51

771,695.88

1,145,069.39

174,845,112.60

I-3A-2

073871AF2

03/23/2012

0.46400%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

I-M-1

073871AG0

03/23/2012

0.57400%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

I-M-2

073871AH8

03/23/2012

0.67400%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

I-B-1

073871AJ4

03/23/2012

1.49400%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

I-B-2

073871AK1

03/23/2012

2.39400%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

I-B-3

073871AL9

03/23/2012

2.39400%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

I-X-P

073871CL7

02/29/2012

0.00000%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

B-IO

073871CM5

02/29/2012

0.00000%

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

 

As you can clearly see the ONLY people with skin in the game now is the AAA investors.

The banks and the FED should not be allowed to manipulate the LIBOR to save themselves at the expense of CalPERS or other public pension funds as well. The FED announcing LIBOR will remain near zero until 2014 -2015 clearly shows they believe that all trusts will be liquidated by that date. Or, they are projecting that the trust will reach the 10% remaining asset mark which allows the banks to dissolve the trust. You can bet that they will drive the LIBOR back up after that occurs and they are holding all remaining assets.

So will CalPERS stand by and lose half of all it invested in real estate by 2015? Will pensions funds stand by and let Wall Street manipulate the entire market to ensure they win big and the pension funds are wiped out? Has CalPERS calculated this sort of loss into the business plan? Most importantly, does it really have to be this way?

It has been shocking that in all the pension lawsuits against the various Wall Street banks, manipulation of LIBOR and how that has caused losses is never mentioned. Rather than just suing for return of losses, CalPERS and other pension funds should confront the banks and demand that they renegotiate the loans. This will solve the problem for the homeowners and the pension funds. Why should everyone else be harmed because the banks created a flawed model for these trusts?

Banks created, manipulated, and are still manipulating the Frankenstein monster securities they created. Deutsche Bank called the monsters, “pigs and crap.” Goldman Sachs called their monsters, “shitty deals,” and Fabulous “Fab” aka Mr. Tourre stated “those poor subprime borrowers won’t last long.”

 

So, your honor, before you kick me out of my home, you should understand that your pension would be better served by forcing the lender to modify my loan. You’ve been lied to and it wasn’t me that lied. I’ve been begging for a stinking loan modification for years and the idiots who are the mangers of the mortgage backed securities in your pension fund care more about themselves than your retirement. Don’t believe me; maybe this study will convince you.

From the beginning Wall Street giants like Deutsche and Goldman cared little for the investors and instead schemed to gain a substantial benefit by gaming the implosion by betting against the securities for their benefit. Will CalPERS and other pension funds stand for them continuing to manipulate and serve their best interest at the expense of the pension funds they sold their monsters too?

Spill over collateral damages are found throughout the CalPERS portfolio. An example can be found in the SAMI 2007-AR4 security featured in my study. CalPERS also invested in Bear Stearns and its affiliates Structured Asset Mortgage Investments and Bear Stearns Financial Products, the sponsor, depositor, underwriter, and swap provider for this trust.

 

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1243106/000106823807001061/sami2007ar4_424b5.htm

 

In the Structured Asset Mortgage Investment “SAMI 2007-AR4” trust 948 of the 3042 (39.91% of the pool) loans worth $458,844,453 were California loans and foreclosure of those loans will hurt the California real estate market and some of those homes might even belong to CalPERS members. In SAMI 2,684 of the loans interest rate were tied to the MTA index plus an added margin of over 3% even though CalPERS currently only receives less than .55%.

About CalPERS

In December of 2009 the value of real estate investments held by the nation’s largest public pension fund has plummeted, and the California Public Employees’ Retirement System terminated some of its investment managers as a result. It was reported that the value of those investments dropped 30% in the quarter ending Sept. 30. CalPERS investment in the Stuyvesant Town-Peter Cooper Village apartment complex in New York was threatened by a collapse of the residential property market and by the prospect of bankruptcy by CalPERS’ partners in the venture, Blackrock Inc. and Tishman Speyer Properties. CalPERS also invested in large bankrupt originators such as American Home, and insurers who are falling like flies under the pressure of all the default claims.

During the economic crisis, CalPERS funds lost $100 billion in value from September 2008 and March 2009. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) has fought back. They filed a securities fraud complaint against Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. over $700 million Lehman bonds and 3.9 million shares of Lehman bonds when Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, a shareholder lawsuit against Bank of America Corp. (BAC) over its Merrill Lynch acquisition, and another suit against Bank of America’s Countrywide Financial. On Jan. 13, 2012 Judge Richard Kramer in San Francisco ruled that Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service Inc. must face CALPERS $1 billion lawsuit over their ratings of structured investment vehicles.

A published report said CalPERS made policy changes allowing more risk and debt, followed by large ill-timed investments at the height of the real estate boom, resulting in a real estate portfolio worth $13.7 billion in January, down 47.5 percent for the year. CalPERS used “leverage” or debt to make major higher-risk investments at the height of the boom. The staff report said CalPERS, in percentage terms, had the biggest losses among a half dozen large pension funds in the last three years.

CalPERS sold $16 billion worth of income-producing and other low risk real estate, said the report, and then spent the money while buying $30 billion worth of higher risk real estate as the market peaked in 2005 and 2006.

The very ability of CalPERS to meet its commitments is now in jeopardy. CalPERS has taken massive losses, may be in serious trouble for long term stability, and in January of 2012 posted a dismal 1% return in 2011 on its investment portfolio. CalPERS states that it must achieve an annual return of 7.75% that the fund needs to meet current and future obligations to its members.

 

The history of the fund’s performance is shocking when you see the overall downturn in the past few years. CalLPERS must recover to the tune of the loss suffered of about a quarter of its assets. The problems will boost retirement costs by millions of dollars for the state government and more than 3,000 local agencies that participate in CalPERS. Actuary Alan Milligan suggested lowering the assumed annual rate of return from 7.75%, where it’s been for the last decade, to 7.25%.

 

According to my study this is still looking through rose colored glasses unless CalPERS takes a more aggressive stance against the banks violating their fiduciary duty in management of the residential and commercial real estate assets CalPERS holds.

The financially beleaguered state government and school districts probably will be paying more for their employees’ pensions, starting next summer. A key committee of the board of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System on Tuesday voted 6 to 2 to cut its benchmark assumed rate of return on its investments to 7.5% from a two-decade-old target of 7.75%. The change will cost the state general fund an additional $167 million, boosting the total bill for the 2012-13 fiscal year to approximately $3.7 billion.

CalPERS and its managers were riding high during the height of the real estate boom. In June 2006 annual real estate returns averaged 22 percent during the five previous years, but now scandal after scandal has rocked CalPERS. Senior investment officer during the real estate boom, Mike McCook, was listed as one of the “30 most influential people in private equity real estate” in a November 2006 issue of Private Equity Real Estate. But when it was about to go bust, he went to work for Kenwood Investments, a private equity real estate firm in San Francisco founded in 1999 by Darius Anderson who paid a $500,000 settlement in a New York probe of kickbacks for obtaining pension fund investments. Anderson, who received “placement agent” fees for a CalPERS investment, was not charged in New York. McCook then moved to Resmark Equity Partners in Los Angeles. A former board member Alfred Villalobos misconduct was exposed acting as a placement agent representing private equity and investment firms seeking CalPERS contracts, and former CalPERS CEO Fred Buenrostro were indicted by a state grand jury on fraud changes as part of an influence-peddling scandal.

Conflicts of interest and self-dealing issues have plagued the fund including claims that it was too cozy with outside investment firms and allowed go-betweens to get exorbitant fees simply for referring deals to many of Wall Street’s most powerful private equity, hedge fund and real estate investment managers. How many bad mortgage investments were made under this collusive arrangement?

 

DEALING WITH THE CARDS YOU’RE DEALT

 

No doubt there is plenty of liability to go around, but what about dealing with the hand CALPERS is holding and making the most out of it? Does CALPERS really have to suffer the massive losses from the subprime mortgage collapse? Why hasn’t CALPERS explored whether renegotiating mortgages is in the best interest of the borrowers and the investments they hold? While officials at CalPERS are attempting to avert disaster and protect the fund from another financial meltdown, they are missing how they can contain the damage they are currently suffering.

 

Instead of investigating ways of fixing the problems, in February of 2011, James G. Lasher, a senior portfolio manager for real estate, became the third senior portfolio manager to resign from the CalPERS. Senior portfolio managers of $47.5 billion alternative investment management program, Joncarlo Mark and Michael Dutton, also resigned.

 

Mr. Lasher joined CalPERS following the financial blowup of the system’s $15.4 billion real estate portfolio during the housing crisis. Ted Eliopoulos was the senior investment officer for CalPERS real estate holdings. Lasher was managing investments in 20 funds focused on residential investments. Why didn’t any of these managers consider analyzing the investments and actively seeking solutions to minimize damages as my study shows?

 

CalPERS only solution has been to attempt a wind down the housing portfolio under a new real estate investment plan that shifts the assets Mr. Lasher managed into a $6.8 billion legacy portfolio and sell those assets under a three-year plan , ensuring huge losses.

 

Ms. Guillot, a former managing director and chief operating officer for Barclays Global Investors joined CalPERS in April 2010, and should be well versed in mortgage backed securities. Why couldn’t Ms. Guillot, who came from the Wall Street world, negotiate with the trust managers to save the investments? This is exactly what I’m proposing, CalPERS should consider how renegotiating mortgages could protect the investments rather than figuring out how to dump them and suffer massive losses. CalPERS should uphold its fiduciary role to ensure that the beneficiaries receive the future pension and health benefits for which they have entrusted CalPERS.

 

Before you, your honor is two choices; you can certainly throw me out of my home, but should you? Is it really in your best interest? That’s the question. Will you let Wall Street snooker you one more time?

 

Paula Rush

Forensic Securitization Auditor

 

Website: paularush.com

Blog: paularush.me

Loan Finder: loandatafinder.com

 

 

Recommended reading:

http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/pubs/annual-investment-report-2010.pdf

http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/pubs/comprehensive-annual-fina-report-2011.pdf

How CalPERS bet big on real estate and lost

http://calpensions.com/2010/04/30/how-CalPERS-bet-big-on-real-estate-and-lost/

CalPERS Alleges Top Lehman Execs Misled On Exposures, Financials, The Wall Street Journal

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-13/s-p-moody-s-must-face-CalPERS-lawsuit-over-ratings-judge-rules.html

http://www.pionline.com/article/20120206/PRINTSUB/302069983

http://www.pionline.com/article/20110217/DAILYREG/110219894

http://www.CalPERS.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/board-cal-agenda/agendas/full/201103/srrr.pdf

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